In the preface to Just and Unjust Wars, which he wrote in 1977, Michael Walzer makes the following observation about how he came to think about just and unjust wars:
I did not begin by thinking about war in general, but about particular wars and above all about the American intervention in Vietnam. Nor did I begin as a philosopher, but as a political activist and a partisan. . . . We are not usually philosophical in moment of crisis; most often there is no time. War especially imposes an urgency that is probably incompatible with philosophy as a serious enterprise. The philosopher . . . reflects in tranquility . . . thinking about political and moral choices already made. And yet, these choices are made in philosophical terms, available because of previous reflection. It was, for example, a matter of great importance to all of us in the American antiwar movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s that we found a moral doctrine ready at hand, a connected set of names and concepts that we all knew-and that everyone else knew. When we talked about aggression and neutrality, the rights of prisoners of war and civilians, atrocities and war crimes, we were drawing upon the work of many generations of men and women, most of whom we had never heard of. We would be better off if we did not need a vocabulary like that, but given that we need it, we must be grateful that we have it. Without this vocabulary, we could not have thought about the Vietnam war as we did, let alone have communicated our thoughts to other people. (xi) I cite Walzer at length because the current conjecture may seem quite similar to the one Walzer describes. In the past six years alone there have been several dramatic terrorist attacks by fundamentalist Islamic groups that are loosely networked, including the September 11, 2001, bombings These and other events create a sense of urgency that motivates focused thought on the immediate situation. As Walzer points out, thinking of this kind benefits from normative theoretical analyses and discussions of war that happen when the demands created by an immediately present conflict subside-at present from those that took place after the Vietnam War, resembling those Walzer offered in Just and Unjust Wars (2004) . However, unlike Walzer, who has been reaffirming his beliefs about the doctrine of just war, I believe there is a way in which the current conjecture is not analogous to the one that Walzer dealt with in the 1970s-the 1970s were marked by cold-war bipolarity while the present is an era of post-cold-war capitalist globalization 2 -and I am moved by the dissimilarity in question to consider the possibility that despite the existing exigency, it is necessary to engage war on its many guises normatively as well as to engage and not merely rely on the normative doctrines and conceptual vocabularies of just war that are used to frame most of the current discourses of war and terrorism.
The key to how germane the just war doctrine was for Walzer is that it made an ethico-political argument about war possible. In the 1960s and 1970s, this was extremely important since it looked then as if due to the hegemony of realism, which construes all human relations (especially international ones) as a play of forces grounded in interests, only the antiwar movement offered an ethico-political approach to the Vietnam War that was an alternative to the official discourse of war. Indeed, Walzer dedicates the first chapter of his book to an argument against realism in order to clear the way for the development of his "moral argument" about war. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, even realists take values as a force to reckon with. As Leslie Gelb and Justine Rosenthal (2003, 2) note about American foreign policy, "Morality, values, ethics, universal principles-the whole panoply of ideas in international affairs that were once the exclusive domain of preachers and scholars-have taken root in the hearts or at least the minds, of the American foreign policy community." Recognizing that they nonetheless have a second place when it comes to national security issues, Gelb and Rosenthal clarify the weight of having any place at all in the calculus at the base of foreign policy stating that the second place occupied by values in international affairs means that "leaders now have to be mindful of ignoring or abusing what are increasingly seen as universal values." Gelb and Rosenthal conclude with the claim, "We have passed from an era in which ideals were always flatly opposed to self-interest into an era in which tension remains between the two, but the stark juxtaposition of the past has largely subsided. Now, ideals and self-interests are both generally considered necessary ingredients of the national interest" (7).
For the just war doctrine, the change that Gelb and Rosenthal describe entails political efficacy through an integration into policy deliberations and into military strategy, tactics, education, and military operations, an integration that at face value can have striking consequences since the just war doctrine sets major constraints on military engagement. This is the kind of good that Gelb and Rosenthal have in mind. But, while appearing to gain political influence, the just war doctrine also loses something, possibly via a certain cooptation of that about it that is critical, which takes place when it is institutionalized. Thus, Nicholas Rengger (2002) suggests, in the context of pondering the future of the just war conceptual framework, that its legalization has undermined its functioning as an ethical framework since it redescribes a particularist approach to the many possible issues that war raises in terms of universal principles seen to be embedded in international law. As Michael Ignatieff (2001) remarks, among the problems with this is that decision makers worry about these legal principles rather than the moral specificities that arise in each situation and, in addition, an illusion about the nature of war, according to which war is "clean" since, after all, it can meet formal standards, begins to form, and take hold.
It is possible that while this is happening, merely the deployment of the just war doctrine by left liberals and feminists can revive what is otherwise eroding due to the institutionalization of the very same doctrine. Moreover, because the just war doctrine now seems to have become truly part of political culture, critics who use it may be better able to reach out and participate in political dialogue with more than just those who already have similar positions. But I would like to investigate the just war doctrine itself because, as I mentioned before, the current conjuncture is different. The least that has happened is the end of the cold war, which all wars fought between 1945 and 1990 were influenced by, even when not fought as proxy wars. Another change that has x Hypatia taken place is within the nature of war itself. War is no longer fought between uniformed armies that represent countries and are under the control of a government. Though there are still armies and they represent countries and are under the control of governments, most organized violence with a political agenda is deployed by small groups functioning as guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists and hiding among civilians (see Smith 2007) .
For me, thinking is always a process done in relation to and conversation with others and it is in this spirit that this collection of reflections on just war doctrine and reminders about women and the ways they are entangled with violent conflicts and shape their relations to them should be read. While I organized the collection in the manner I believe will most provoke a conversational manner of thinking, because each essay represents an individual's engagement with the issues that moved her most while writing her contribution, there is no order for the readings that I can actually recommend. Nonetheless, I do want to say something about the essays and the threads I see connecting them.
I begin by noting that all contributors to this collection are self-identified feminists. While this does not necessarily mean that gender is a category of analysis that all the essays invoke, it does mean that the authors have certain honed sensibilities that frame their reflections. As feminists they also share what Cheshire Calhoun calls an "inventive realism" (2004, 4), which implies, on the one hand, an attentiveness to life as it is lived and experienced that is accompanied by an openness to that which is messy and indeterminate, and on the other, a willingness to be imaginative about theoretical possibilities that others do not necessarily take seriously.
Kelly Oliver's "Women: The Secret Weapon of Modern Warfare?" and Dorit Naaman's "Unruly Daughters to Mother Nation: Palestinian and Israeli Firstperson Films," with which the collection begins, are both examples of a feminist critical realism that explores the representation of women by others (Oliver) and by themselves (Naaman). Oliver analyzes and compares the representations of the women who were involved in torture in Abu Ghraib, shahidas (women suicide bombers), and U.S. women soldiers in Iraq. While these representations have complicated feminist debates about equality, Oliver believes they need to be critiques on different grounds, and she calls attention to the manner in which they discursively constitute women as weapons feeding on an imagination peopled by the Hollywood femme fatal and similar figures who lure men to destruction, which they can do because their sexualized femininity is on display to hide their lethality. Naaman examines two autobiographical films, Yuli Cohen Gerstel's My Land Zion and Ebtisam Mara'ana's Paradise Lost in the context of a discussion of both Jewish Israeli and Palestinian women's resistance to normative roles and expectations embedded in the national/nationalist script for women. The films question the burdening of motherhood with national/ nationalist goals that turn male children and increasingly women children as well into "canon fodder." Together, the Oliver and Naaman essays probe deeply into the complexity of representing gender and war together. Oliver's essay alerts one to deeper cultural grids that even untraditional images of women, which cast women in masculine roles such as that of the warrior, get connected to. In an interesting way, this sheds a light on the effort to resist the traditional roles of women that Naaman's essay elaborates.
"Replacing Just War Theory with an Ethics of Sexual Difference," Danielle Poe's essay, weaves a line that runs from Jane Addams's brand of pacifism to Luce Irigaray's ethics of sexual difference. Poe argues for the abandonment of the just war framework because of the costs of even a war deemed just under the framework. The alternative to the reliance on violence even in situations in which a turn to violence seems justified as a last resort is, according to Poe, a nonviolent form of resistance. Poe turns to Addams, pacifist cofounder of the Women's Peace Party, for an argument that exposes the costs of war Addams found intolerable because they were constitutive of the kinds of people we are. Poe's alternative emphasizes the values of compassion, kindness, and hospitality. While the dispositions to be compassionate, kind, and hospitable are eroded by violence, they are also the dispositions that need to be nurtured to make war less appealing. Poe uses Irigaray's work to ground the dispositions of compassion, kindness, and hospitality and examples of their practice by people engaged in nonviolent resistance.
Marian Eide, like Poe, is suspicious of the just war doctrine. In " 'The Stigma of Nation': Feminist Just War, Privilege, and Responsibility," she takes Virginia Woolf's ironic and suggestive Three Guineas as a point of entry into the question of what a feminist in today's United States, located not fully outside of but neither fully included in a citizenship marked by military service, can say about just war theory in general and wars (just or unjust) fought by the country with which she has such a complex relation. Eide adds to our understanding of the complexity of a woman facing the question of thinking about war by narrating the story of her mother who served with the Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1950s but due to her eventual marriage and parenting, was first demoted, and later dismissed. Following Woolf, Eide points out that her mother and women more generally have the strange privilege of being located in such a way as to be able to distance themselves from the stigma of the nation when the nation acts unjustly in the name of its citizens. And yet women cannot distance so much so that they avoid thinking about war altogether, and Eide takes the challenge of thinking about war seriously, pursuing relentlessly the many problems that arise for its justification without opting at the outset for pacifism, though it seems to be Woolf's recommendation to women and an option that Eide has found attractive.
Eide's use of biography/autobiography in her essay is not a simple appeal to firsthand experience. Like Naaman, who also entwines biographical/ autobiographical reflections with her analysis, Eide too uses personal stories to elucidate aspects of the gendered social location and open an avenue for critical reflexivity. In both of these essays, the personal and the social both mirror and refract each other, producing a denser substance for further mirroring and refraction. Though not involving a biographical/autobiographical narrative, Debra Bergoffen's "The Just War Tradition: Translating the Ethics of Human Dignity into Political Practices," produces similar effects.
Bergoffen argues against dismissing the just war doctrine prematurely. She uses both realist and pacifist criticisms of the just war doctrine in order to expose its built-in ambiguities and argues that it is exactly these ambiguities that create an opening for feminist theorizing about just war doctrine. Just war doctrine, Bergoffen argues that just war doctrine has been and can be mobilized in the service of feminists arguing against patriarchal war values and for women's human rights. It does so exactly because it insists on moral constraints on conduct in war and because these constraints have historically been and can continue to be built on in specific, pragmatic ways, including, for example, the ways the doctrine has been mobilized to include rape in war as a human-rights violation in the International Criminal Court. In doing so and succeeding pragmatically, just war doctrine, Bergoffen believes, resists both the logic of the one (in its tyrannical version of absolute victory) and of the two (positioned in the friend/enemy dyadic relation) and offers a logic of the many-a basically democratic logic.
Sigal Ben-Porath also finds something of value in the just war doctrine, although she believes it requires some specific revisions. Her essay, "Care Ethics and Dependence-Rethinking Jus Post Bellum," brings out a less-emphasized aspect of just war doctrine: the justice to be expected after a war is over. Eide has also opened the question of jus post bellum and argues that it must be central to a feminist just war doctrine. According to Ben-Porath, not only should just war doctrine be extended to include a jus post bellum component but this component should also rely significantly on a care ethics perspective and this perspective needs to be amended by way of weakening the aim of ending dependence in recognition of the enmeshments of societies with one another.
For Margaret Denike, fixing the just war doctrine will not work since the latest fix has been relying on the use of human rights as justifying engagements in wars that seem to mock their own justifications. Denike is especially concerned with the "war on terror," and in her essay, "The Human Rights of Others: Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and 'Just Causes' for the 'War on Terror,' " she assesses the appropriation of international human rights by humanitarian law and policy. She maps representations of the perpetrators and victims of "tyranny" and "terror," and their role in providing a "just cause" for the U.S.-led "war on terror." By examining narratives of progress and human rights heroism, Denike shows how human rights discourses, when used together with the pretense of self-defense and preemptive war does the opposite of what they claim.
In "Just War and the Problem of Evil," Robin May Schott expresses her concerns about the usefulness of just war doctrine and asks whether it makes sense after Auschwitz. Schott believes that the experience of Auschwitz requires that war be addressed through an ethical framework that incorporates the concepts of evil and witnessing, which she takes as the most central concepts for a postAuschwitz ethics. Schott follows Immanuel Kant, who declared war to be the central problem of evil and Hannah Arendt, who believed that violence could never be legitimated, to reject the idea of just war. War, if it is to take place, Schott believes, must remain a necessary evil. When war is seen clearly as evil, Schott suggests, a space can be opened for nonmilitaristic solutions.
Schott's take on the question of war, due to its centering of evil and witnessing brings out something that many of the essays in the collection are struggling with, namely, that about war which horrifies-widespread destruction, cheapening of human life, victimization, and moral damage to perpetrators-and the consequent moral stresses that war places people under and the moral courage that responses to it require. It is, therefore, with some trepidation that I decided to position my own essay both after Schott's essay and as the last essay in the collection. Still, the location seems fitting since I think that dwelling on the relation between politics and war, which is what I do in "The Opposition of Politics and War," requires that one be aware of war as ethically haunting, leaving one's thinking about it always undone. I do not mean to suggest by the above that a hierarchical relation exists between ethics and politics with ethics being a rung on a ladder leading to better thinking about politics. However, because I have been influenced enough by Machiavelli to insist on the separation of ethics from politics and enough by Arendt to insist on the dignity of politics, I do not think that politics can or ought to be subsumed under ethics. What my essay attempts to get at is at least some way in which war is politically haunting as well and leaves one's political theorizing of it always destabilized. Because of this, the essay ends with the exploration of the claim that a nonideal, normative differentiation among kinds of violence is affirmed as that which politically "cannot not be wanted." 3 As I hope is clear from the description of the essays in the collection, they are diverse without being either inclusive or representative of all possible feminist positions about war, the relation of gender and war, or the just war doctrine. Feminists have been thinking about war when felt called upon to do so by circumstances with World War I occasioning the first sustained feminist reflections and activism with respect to war. World War II occasioned another burst of sustained feminist reflections with respect to war. These were followed by an additional burst in the late sixties and early seventies during the wars of decolonization and in the United States in relation to the Vietnam War in particular. 4 We are in a period that again occasions sustained feminist reflections about war as is evident from feminist conferences devoted to war and collections xiv Hypatia like this. It saddens me that so much of our collective creative energies are channeled in this way. While due to personal history I have devoted much of my creative energies to thinking about war and terrorism, feminists need to resist having our creative energies refocused and sapped by them.
Notes
For a list of current conflicts, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ 1. war/index.html.
Military historians and international affairs analysts agree that war has changed. 2. There is less of a consensus on the causes of the change or the relations of the change undergone by war to changed socioeconomic and political conditions. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that war cannot be analyzed outside the historical context. See, for example, Weltman 1995; and Joas 2003. I borrow this phrase from Spivak 1993. 3.
Contemporary feminist have been recognizing this and returning to some of the 4. texts produced since World War I. Thus, for example, Addams's writing and speeches about war and peace (2003) are being reread. Woolf's Three Guineas (1938) has found a wide readership as well. Personally, I tend to return to Rosa Luxemburg's texts (1915) because they insightfully position World War I in relation to imperialism and are critical of patriotism and question its easy mobilizations for suspect causes.
